How are perceptual decisions made? The answer to this seemingly simple question necessitates that we specify the nature of perceptual representations on which decisions are based. Some traditional models postulate that the perceptual representation consists of a simple point estimate of the stimulus. Such models do not allow the estimation of sensory uncertainty. On the other hand, recent models have proposed that the perceptual representation involves a full probability distribution over the possible stimulus values. Such models allow a precise estimation of sensory uncertainty. These two possibilities -point estimates vs. full distributions -are often seen as the only alternatives but they are not. Here I present five possible perceptual representation schemes that allow the extraction of different levels of sensory uncertainty. I explain where popular models fall within the five schemes and explore the relevant empirical evidence and theoretical arguments. The overwhelming evidence is at odds with both point estimates vs. full distributions. This conclusion is in stark contrast with current popular models in computational neuroscience built on such distributions. Instead, the most likely scheme appears to be one in which the perceptual representation features a point estimate coupled with a strength---of---evidence value.
INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty in perception
Everybody in the audience is quiet. The tennis player has a match point. The play turns into a long rally from the baseline until her opponent hits a shot that seems to land just out. However, the line judge remains quiet implying that the ball was inside the court. The player can stop the play and challenge the call using the replay system. The problem is that she will automatically lose the point if the ball was indeed not out. What should she do?
Situations that push our perceptual abilities to the edge are common in tennis. They are also more common in our daily life than we realize. We make judgments on when to cross a busy road that lacks traffic lights, who is the person talking outside our office door, and whether the "weird" smell indicates that the cheese is just right or completely spoiled.
The nature of the perceptual representation
The first step in understanding how we make the perceptual decisions described above is to determine the nature of the perceptual representation. When the tennis player ponders whether to challenge the call, what information is she basing her decision on?
Some traditional theories imply that the player only forms a point estimate of the most likely landing location of the ball (Figure 1, left) . In contrast, many recent 4 theories argue for the existence of a full probability distribution over landing locations (Figure 1, right) . Deciding between these competing possibilities is not only fundamental for understanding the nature of our perceptual representation but would necessarily falsify a large number of popular theories that imply the wrong representation.
Figure 1. Perceptual representation of ball landing location in tennis.
Two extreme proposals for the nature of perceptual representations exist: the representation may consist of a simple point estimate (represented on the left as a ball landing just outside the court) or a full probability distribution (represented on the right as a ball landing within a certain area of the court).
A false dichotomy
The distinction between point estimates and full probability distributions 
FIVE SCHEMES FOR THE NATURE OF THE PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION
The perceptual representation of a given stimulus is different in different stages of the visual hierarchy. Here we are interested in the perceptual representation that the brain uses at the decisional level (Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013) . Even if full distributions could be extracted from the population response in V1 or MT, it does not follow that this information is in fact available at the decision stage.
The five schemes presented below are arranged in order of increasing complexity.
To compare between them, I use the example of representing the direction of a single moving bar (Figure 2A ). For simplicity, I will assume that the moving bar activates to a different degree a set of 36 neurons each having its receptive field centered 10° away from the previous one ( Figure 2B ). The question is what part of this population code is available for making the final decision.
Scheme 1. Single point estimate (no sensory uncertainty)
A first possibility is that the perceptual representation consists of a single point estimate ( Figure 2C ). For example, the direction a moving bar would be represented as a single orientation (e.g., 50°). In our neural example, the point estimate could be based on which of the 36 neurons has the highest activity.
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However, more complex scenarios are also possible. For example, it is possible that maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) or another method is used to estimate the most likely direction of motion by taking into account all 36 neurons. The critical point, however, is that only the single value is passed onto the decision stage and therefore this first scheme does not allow the estimation of sensory uncertainty.
A popular model that falls within this scheme is the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) . In its most common variant, a particle diffuses towards one of two boundaries representing each choice and the decision is made when the particle reaches one of the boundaries ( Figure 3A) . At the end of the process, the only available information is which of the two boundaries was reached -a single point estimate. Other examples from this category are low---and high---threshold models which postulate that stimuli give rise to a limited number -typically 2 -internal states (Krantz, 1969) .
Scheme 2. Multiple point estimates (indirect sensory uncertainty)
The second possibility is that the perceptual representation consists of multiple point estimates ( Figure 2D ). For example, in estimating the direction of motion, people may additionally estimate the contrast of the bar, as well as their own decision time and attentional state. These additional estimates may provide clues about the reliability of the main point estimate. Therefore, this second scheme allows only for an indirect estimation of the sensory uncertainty. The drift diffusion model could also fall within this scheme since on each trial it explicitly represents the decision time ( Figure 3A) , which can then be used to judge the task difficulty (Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014) .
Scheme 3. Strength of evidence (minimal sensory uncertainty)
The third possibility is that the perceptual representation consists of a point estimate complemented by a "strength---of---evidence" value ( Figure 2E ). For example, the direction of a moving bar would be represented with its mostly likely value (e.g., 50°) together with a judgment about the strength of evidence for this value. In our neural example, the motion representation may be based on which of the 36 neurons has the highest activity, as well as on the actual level of this activity. As in Scheme 1, more complex scenarios based on MLE or similar computations that take into account all neurons are also possible. This third scheme allows for what could be called "minimal" estimation of sensory uncertainty.
A popular model that falls within this scheme is signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) . Signal detection theory assumes the existence of a single "evidence" axis in 2---choice tasks. On this axis, each trial produces a single point that represents the strength of evidence ( Figure 3B ). It should be noted that several variants of the drift diffusion model also fall under Scheme 3. For example, models with separate accumulators (Usher & McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970) can produce a strength---of---evidence value based on the comparison of the winning and losing accumulators.
Scheme 4. Partial distribution (partial sensory uncertainty)
The fourth possibility is that the perceptual representation consists of several moments of the sensory distribution ( Figure 2F ). For example, extracting the first four moments of 36---neuron distribution in our example will mean that the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis are explicitly represented. Other summary statistics such as the median are also possible. For simplicity, I will equate Scheme 4 with representing the mean and standard deviation. On a single trial, the direction of a moving bar may therefore be represented as 50° ± 15°. Therefore, this fourth scheme results in partial estimation of sensory uncertainty but still carries more information than Schemes 1---3. No currently popular model of perceptual decision making falls under this scheme. Nevertheless, the models discussed in Scheme 5 could be reduced to fit into this category (Ma, 2010) .
Scheme 5. Full distribution (complete sensory uncertainty)
The final possibility is that the perceptual representation consists of a full probability distribution ( Figure 2G) . Thus, the direction of the moving bar is not summarized but is represented by a complete distribution and therefore allows the complete estimation of sensory uncertainty. This scheme is the only one that will work well in complex situations such as skewed or bimodal distributions. It is also the only scheme that allows for fully optimal decisions on every trial. These features have made this scheme very popular among computational neuroscientists (Beck, Ma, Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012; Berkes, Orbán, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011; Drugowitsch & Pouget, 2012; Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010; Jazayeri & 9 Movshon, 2006; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma, 2010 Ma, , 2012 Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013; Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2000; Sahani & Dayan, 2003; Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget, 1998) .
Two popular models that fall within this scheme are the probabilistic population codes (Ma et al., 2006) and neural sampling with a large number of samples (Fiser et al., 2010) . Models based on probabilistic population codes propose that operations like cue combination can be performed using the whole 36---neuron distribution ( Figure 3C ). Indeed, under certain assumptions, simply adding the distributions produced by each cue results in optimal cue combination. Neural sampling models ( Figure 3D ), on the other hand, propose that neurons take discrete samples from the stimulus in small time intervals. These samples are then combined into a full distribution, provided that enough samples can be taken. Note that taking a single sample results in a Scheme 1 representation, while taking only a few samples may be more similar to a Scheme 3 representation. 
A. Drift diffusion models assume that decisions are made by a particle diffusing towards one of two boundaries, representing the possible stimulus categories (in this case, clockwise and counterclockwise oriented gratings). The decision is based on which boundary was crossed first (Scheme 1). Decisions can also take into account the decision time (Scheme 2). B. Signal detection theory assumes that decisions are made based on which side of a criterion the evidence on a particular trial falls. The distance from the criterion can be used as an estimate of the strength of evidence (Scheme 3). C. Probabilistic population codes assume the existence of a complete distribution built by a population of neurons (Scheme 5). D. Neural sampling models assume that a single neuron takes samples over time. Sufficient number of samples results in a complete distribution (Scheme 5).
However, a single sample results in a point estimate (Scheme 1), while a situation with a small number of samples may be best described by Scheme 3.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As already briefly touched upon, each of the five schemes comes with strong implications about the nature of perceptual decision making. Here I make these implications explicit and compare them with the available empirical evidence. I specifically discuss findings related to confidence ratings and cue combination tasks ( Table 1) . The reason for focusing on these two phenomena is that they directly test people's ability to estimate the uncertainty in their perceptual representations.
Confidence ratings reflect our uncertainty about perceptual judgments for a single stimulus, while cue combination studies test how the uncertainty from two different sensory signals is compared and combined.
Confidence
In virtually every perceptual task subjects automatically and naturally produce confidence ratings (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994) . These confidence ratings reflect the likelihood of being correct (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Fleming & Lau, 2014) . This ability to naturally produce meaningful confidence ratings is strong evidence against Scheme 1. Indeed, this scheme does not feature any information on which appropriate confidence judgments could be based. Scheme 2 also has difficulties but partly meaningful confidence is still possible to the extent to which additional parameters, such as decision time, correlate with performance. Schemes 3---5 easily explain meaningful confidence ratings: higher confidence is associated with higher 13 strength of evidence (Scheme 3), lower standard deviations (Scheme 4), or narrower distributions (Scheme 5).
On the other hand, a number of suboptimalities exist in confidence ratings (Rahnev & Denison, 2016) . For example, subjects are typically either under---or over---confident and are rarely able to calibrate their confidence properly (Adams, 1957; Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Björkman, Juslin, & Winman, 1993; Dawes, 1980; Harvey, 1997; Keren, 1988; Koriat, 2011; . Even more importantly, a large number of studies have reported conditions matched on accuracy that produce different levels of confidence (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2015; Kiani et al., 2014; Koizumi, Maniscalco, & Lau, 2015; Navajas, Sigman, & Kamienkowski, 2014; Rahnev et al., 2011; Rahnev, Bahdo, de Lange, & Lau, 2012; Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, D'Esposito, & Lau, 2015; Samaha, Barrett, Sheldon, LaRocque, & Postle, 2016; Song, Koizumi, & Lau, 2015; Spence, Dux, & Arnold, 2015; Vickers & Packer, 1982; Vlassova, Donkin, & Pearson, 2014; Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhäuser, & Koch, 2008; Zylberberg, Roelfsema, & Sigman, 2014) . Finally, the trial---to---trial relationship between confidence and accuracy, while usually positive, rarely reaches its theoretical maximum Maniscalco, Peters, & Lau, 2016; Massoni, 2014; McCurdy et al., 2013; Schurger, Kim, & Cohen, 2015; Sherman, Seth, Barrett, & Kanai, 2015; Vlassova et al., 2014) . These findings strongly suggest the existence of heuristics in confidence computation. This conclusion is at odds with Scheme 5 since the presence of complete probability distributions should allow for fully Bayesian, rather than heuristic, computations. The extent to which Scheme 4 is consistent with these findings depends on whether subjects can transform the standard deviation of the underlying distribution into probability of being correct. This computation is challenging for humans (Zhang & Maloney, 2012) and may explain some of the biases above. On the other hand, Schemes 2---3 fit well with these findings of suboptimal confidence ratings. Indeed, the probability of being correct is likely a highly non---linear function of the strength of evidence in Scheme 3 and is only imperfectly correlated with parameters such as decision time in Scheme 2. These considerations explain why confidence biases are to be expected in Schemes 2---3. Since Scheme 1 cannot be used to produce confidence ratings, it also cannot explain any of the above biases. 
Cue combination
Cue combination is needed when two or more pieces of information need to be combined to form a single decision (Trommershäuser, Körding, & Landy, 2011) . For example, the length of a bar could be estimated based on a combination of visual and haptic (touch) information (Ernst & Banks, 2002) . When the information from each of these sensory modalities is noisy, the evidence from each is combined in order to arrive at a better estimate than either sense can afford by itself. Pouget, 2004; Ma, 2010 Ma, , 2012 Ma et al., 2006; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013) . Indeed, the existence of a full probability distribution easily explains optimal cue combination (Ma et al., 2006) . Importantly, Scheme 4 also naturally fits with optimal cue combination since such combination only requires the representation of the distributions' mean and standard deviation.
What is less appreciated is that Scheme 3, and to a lesser extent even by Scheme 2, can also explain near optimal performance in cue combination studies. Scheme 3 requires subjects to weight each stimulus' point estimate by the strength---of---evidence value associated with it. In many cases this strategy would result in near optimal performance. Scheme 2 has more difficulties with near optimal cue combination because of its indirect representation of sensory uncertainty. Still, occasional near optimal performance is possible when parameters such as decision time or attentional state are strongly correlated with performance. Thus only Scheme 1 is completely inconsistent with near optimal cue combination.
On the other hand, discussions of cue combination studies often ignore the fact that many such studies have found substantial suboptimalities (Battaglia, Jacobs, & Aslin, 2003; Battaglia, Kersten, & Schrater, 2011; Burr, Banks, & Morrone, 2009; Fetsch, Pouget, Deangelis, & Angelaki, 2012; Knill & Saunders, 2003; Maiworm & Röder, 2011; Prsa, Gale, & Blanke, 2012; Rosas, Wagemans, Ernst, & Wichmann, 2005; Rosas, Wichmann, & Wagemans, 2007) (reviewed in (Rahnev & Denison, 2016) ).
These studies typically report that one of the cues was weighted more than its reliability, relative to the other cue. Such findings are extremely surprising if indeed the brain represents full probability distributions (Scheme 5) or has direct access to the stimulus reliability through the standard deviation of the distribution (Scheme 4). Therefore, these findings argue strongly against Schemes 4 and 5. On the other hand, Schemes 2---3 can easily explain findings of suboptimal cue combination just as they could explain biases in confidence ratings. Scheme 1 would result in random weighting of the cues, which will almost always be suboptimal.
Neural evidence
Little neural evidence has been used to distinguish between schemes for perceptual representation. A notable exception is a recent paper by van Bergen et al. (van Bergen, Ma, Pratte, & Jehee, 2015) . The authors showed that the degree of sensory uncertainty could be directly decoded from activity in the visual cortex. 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST FULL DISTRIBUTIONS
As noted above, full probability distributions (as in Scheme 5) have been accepted among computational neuroscientists almost to the exclusion of other alternatives (Beck et al., 2012; Berkes et al., 2011; Drugowitsch & Pouget, 2012; Fiser et al., 2010; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma, 2010 Ma, , 2012 Ma et al., 2006; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013 Pouget et al., , 2000 Sahani & Dayan, 2003; Zemel et al., 1998) . There seem to be three main reasons for this acceptance. First, computational neuroscientists often prefer to build normative models of how the visual system should or could deal with uncertainty. Full distributions are best for normative computations but there is no a priori reason to expect that the brain implements normative solutions, especially in complex situations (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009; Simon, 1956) . Second, discussions of empirical findings typically focus on findings of optimality, while an extensive literature on suboptimalities in perception (Rahnev & Denison, 2016 ) is often ignored. Finally, Scheme 1 and 5 are typically considered as the only alternatives. In this view, any finding that the brain can extract uncertainty estimates from sensory representations is taken as evidence for full probability distributions. As demonstrated by Schemes 2---4, many other options exist. The issue is further complicated by the fact that terms such as "Bayesian" and "probabilistic" have are often used with different meanings (Box 1). Full probability distributions are further contradicted by several theoretical considerations discussed below.
Real---world tasks are exceedingly complex
Real---life perception comes with an explosion in computational complexity. Such complexity virtually guarantees that decisions will be based on heuristics rather than fully principled computations (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Juslin et al., 2009; Simon, 1956) . Even supporters of full probability distributions admit that complex situations call for simplified computations (Pouget et al., 2013) . Perception evolved to serve us in real life rather than in the laboratory. Thus complex conditions are the norm rather than the exception for the brain. If heuristics are necessary anyway, then perceptual representations that allow the estimation of more than minimal sensory uncertainty (as in Schemes 4 and 5) and are mostly applicable in very simple situations may be an unnecessary luxury.
Discrete judgments
The example used to introduce Schemes 1---5 used a continuous quantity: the motion direction of a bar. However, many decisions involve discrete judgments: who is this person in your high school reunion or what species is the bird on the distant tree? It is unclear how full probability distributions can be constructed and meaningfully used in such situations, especially since relevant possibilities may not be available (e.g., we may have forgotten about Ricardo or not know about the existence of brown---headed cowbirds). Scheme 4 would be completely impossible in such situations since discrete judgments do not allow the computation of a mean and a standard deviation.
Improvements with practice
Perceptual judgments are known to become more optimal with practice (Balci et al., 2011; Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Maddox & Bohil, 2005) . Such findings fit well with Schemes 2 and 3. The reason is that in both of these schemes, the additional quantities (beyond the point estimate) such as decision time and strength of evidence may predict one's accuracy differently for different tasks. Thus, both Schemes 2 and 3 require learning to calibrate how these additional quantities should be used. However, if full probability distributions are present on every trial, it is less clear how and why learning would make judgments more optimal.
Box 1. Are perceptual decisions Bayesian? Are they probabilistic?
The notion that perceptual representations at the decision stage do not consist of full probability distributions has relevance to theories about "Bayesian computation," "probabilistic computation," "probabilistic approach," and "probabilistic brains" (Beck et al., 2012; Drugowitsch & Pouget, 2012; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma, 2010 Ma, , 2012 Ma et al., 2006; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013) . These concepts sound similar but are not necessarily synonymous. Here I explore the implications of rejecting Scheme 5 for these theories.
Are perceptual decisions Bayesian? Decisions are Bayesian as long as they follow Bayes' rule. Much evidence suggests that they do (Rahnev & Denison, 2016) . Are perceptual decisions probabilistic? The term "probabilistic" is more challenging since it has been used in different ways. Ma (Ma, 2010) distinguishes between probabilistic models (in which trial---to---trial observations are stochastic; such models can feature representations consistent with all five schemes) and models of probabilistic computation (which require the representation of at least two moments of the sensory distribution; such models are only consistent with Schemes 21 4 and 5). Nevertheless, Ma's terminology is not widely used. Other papers equate phrases such as the "probabilistic approach" (Pouget et al., 2013) and representing stimuli in a "probabilistic manner" (Fiser et al., 2010) with the existence of the full probability distributions from Scheme 5. Thus, rejecting Scheme 5 means rejecting the notion of probabilistic decisions in some but not other definitions of the term.
Referring to Schemes 1---5 should clarify the exact concept researchers seek to advance. It may also help avoid common logical traps such as stating that the brain computes in a Bayesian manner (true) and concluding that full probability distributions are necessarily needed (false).
WHICH IS THE CORRECT SCHEME?
The empirical evidence is strongly against Scheme 5, which posits full probability distributions. This conclusion is in stark contrast to most of the recent work on computational models of perception that have assumed the presence of complete distributions (Beck et al., 2012; Berkes et al., 2011; Drugowitsch & Pouget, 2012; Fiser et al., 2010; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma, 2010 Ma, , 2012 Ma et al., 2006; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013 Pouget et al., , 2000 Sahani & Dayan, 2003; Zemel et al., 1998) . This conclusion questions the plausibility of probabilistic population codes (Ma et al., 2006) and neural sampling with a large number of samples (Fiser et al., 2010) . Scheme 4 -which proposes that the brain computes partial distribution information such as mean and standard deviation -is also unlikely, especially in the light of the numerous examples of suboptimal cue combination ( Table 1) .
On the other hand, the empirical evidence also strongly contradicts Scheme 1, which posits a single point estimate. This conclusion questions the plausibility of the simplest version of the drift diffusion model where the subject only knows which boundary has been crossed (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) . Scheme 2 -which only allows an indirect estimate of sensory uncertainty -has trouble with findings of meaningful confidence or optimal cue combination. Nevertheless, it is possible the brain computes sufficient number of related parameters to achieve high performance in these tasks. Still, potential proponents of Scheme 2 have the tall task of determining what these parameters are and demonstrating that they are sufficient for near optimal behavior in a number of tasks.
The evidence as a whole therefore provides greatest support for Scheme 3 ( Table   1 ). It should be noted that it is possible to extend Scheme 3 so that different related parameters, such as decision time and attention state, are also estimated (as in Scheme 2). These parameters would still contribute to the decision and can each feature a strength---of---evidence value. Clearly, models that feature this type of uncertainty need to specify explicitly how the strength of evidence is computed and how people learn to relate it to the probability of being correct. Still, the ability of Scheme 3 to naturally account for both findings of optimality and suboptimality makes it a particularly promising model of perceptual decision making.
CONCLUSION
The nature of the perceptual representation at the decision level is still a mystery.
Proposals vary from single point estimates to full probability distributions. This paper presents five possible schemes for the nature of the perceptual representation. Evidence from confidence and cue combination studies is at odds with both single point estimates and full distributions. The latter are the preferred schemes in most popular models in computational neuroscience. Instead, the most likely scheme features a point estimate accompanied by a strength---of---evidence value.
